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LaRue Tone Hosmer 
I t is possible to think of the responsibilities of corporate managers on either the macro level--accountable  to w h o m - - o r  the micro 
level--accountable  for what. Discussions of 
managerial responsibilities on the macro "to 
whom" level have been ongoing for years, cer- 
tainly since Berle and Means (1936) first noted 
the replacement of company  owners by profes- 
sional managers,  without reaching a widely ac- 
cepted conclusion. Perhaps instead of continuing 
those discussions it would be well to move back 
a step, or down a notch, and begin to consider 
the micro, "for what" responsibilities of manage- 
ment. What activities should corporate managers 
be held accountable to perform, and to perform 
well? 
Before starting to discuss the activities we 
can reasonably expect the managers  of business 
firms to perform, and perform well, let me make 
a few comments  about the problem of reaching a 
widely shared conclusion on the responsibilities 
of management  at the macro level. It is a basic 
tenet of commercial  law that managers are ac- 
countable primarily to the owners of the busi- 
ness. It is a basic principle of neoclassical eco- 
nomics that managers are accountable solely to 
the stockholders of the firm. People who  adopt  
the very logical thought s tructures-- the "ways of 
looking at the w o r l d ' - - o f  either the legal system 
o r  the market paradigm are not easily going to 
give up one of their most crucial underlying as- 
sumptions. We may d isagree- -and  by "we" I 
mean the normative ethicists and social philoso- 
phers who  are contributing articles to this special 
edition of Business Horizons---but that does not 
mean that we will be  able to convince attorneys 
o r  economists. Most of us in this issue believe 
that the macro responsibilities of corporate man- 
agers have to be extended to the society of 
which the company  is a part, rather than be lim- 
ited to a small segment of owners within that 
society. Most of us think that a substantial num- 
bet  of compelling 
arguments have been  
presented in support  
of that view (Stone 
1975, Velasquez 1982, 
DeGeorge 1982, 
Hosmer  1984, McCoy 
1985, Bowie 1991). 
Most of us recognize, 
however, that we 
have not convinced 
advocates of the rule 
To get managers to 
act  ethically, we must 
hold them account- 
able on an ethical 
level of management.  
of law or of the power  of markets; had we done 
so this special edition would not be needed. 
My suggestion, given that lack of success, is 
that we should move from the "to whom" issue 
on to the "for what" question. This article is a first 
step in that direction. Others may have tried this 
approach- - i t  is certainly the basis for managerial 
control (Anthony, Reece, and Welsch 1985)--but 
I am not conscious of any earlier efforts that 
looked at ethical rather than financial account- 
ability. If it is indeed a first step, then I would 
hope  that readers will tolerate a few rough edges 
along the way. 
I would argue that the basic activities we can 
legitimately expect managers to perform, and 
perform well, can easily be identified by examin- 
ing the curriculum at a series of reputable 
s c h o o l s  of business administration, and by con- 
sidering the content of a number  of reputable 
texts on business management.  I would further 
argue that this set of activities can be roughly 
divided into strata reflecting the assignment of 
those tasks to the different levels of management  
in a hierarchical structure. And I would lastly 
argue that the activities within each stratum can 
be generally associated with a set of reasonably 
explicit performance criteria, or responsibilities. 
There is nothing very new here and, I would 
hope,  nothing very controversial. All I am saying 
is that we can identify a different set of manage- 
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rial activities at each level within an organization, 
that we can set up a different set of performance 
criteria for each level, and that we can reasonably 
expect to hold managers accountable to those 
criteria. I have proposed five strata and 15 crite- 
ria. You might prefer four and 12, or six and 18. 
The numbers are not important. The belief that 
we can identify, assign, and measure the perfor- 
mance of different managerial activities is impor- 
tant. I would hope  that we all are willing to ac- 
cept that belief for now. 
I said that there was nothing very new in the 
concept  of a hierarchy of managerial activities 
within a business firm, with a set of performance 
criteria or managerial responsibilities associated 
with each level within the hierarchy, and I as- 
sume that is correct. I recognize, however, that 
there is something new in placing a set of "ethi- 
cal" activities and responsibilities at the apex of 
that hierarchy rather than in diffusing them 
throughout all levels of the organization (see 
Figure 1), and I understand that this placement 
may appear  controversial to some. 
My argument in support  of that placement, 
which I should like to summarize very briefly 
here, is that w e - - a n d  once again by "we" I mean 
the normative ethicists and social philosophers 
who  are concerned that business firms and busi- 
ness people  operate in a manner  that can be 
described as "right" and "proper" and "just"-- 
have downplayed the importance of our field of 
study. We have looked upon  our theories as pe- 
ripheral to the management  of the firm rather 
than as central to that management ,  as correc- 
tions to wrongful behavior rather than as direc- 
tives for rightful action. 
It seems clear to me that the conditions of 
management  have changed, and consequently 
that the activities of  management  must also have 
changed or be now in the process of changing. 
Business firms have become larger in size, more 
complex in form, and much more competitive in 
nature. My argument is that as we move from 
small, simple, relatively non-competit ive firms to 
those that are large, complex, and very competi- 
tive, we also move  from focusing on the lower to 
concentrating on the higher of these managerial 
activities. I think it is fairly easy to demonstrate 
that progression from the operational through the 
functional and technical levels to the conceptual 
(or strategic). The purpose  of this article is to 
show that the next step in that progression will 
necessarily be  to the ethical level. 
By "ethical level," I mean the activities of 
management  that result in a distribution of the 
benefits produced by the firm and an allocation 
of the costs imposed by the firm in a manner  that 
can be described by the various stakeholders of 
the firm as "right" and "proper" and "just." This is 
not an activity currently performed by most busi- 
ness executives. This is not an activity currently 
taught at most business schools. My argument is 
that as businesses become larger, more complex, 
and much more competitive, they also become 
much more d e p e n d e n t - - o n  their workers, man- 
agers, technicians, executives, suppliers, distribu- 
tors, customers, creditors, owners, and the local, 
regional, and national voters. 
My final argument is that this process of in- 
creasing dependence  is not ongoing; it is com- 
plete. Large, complex and globally competitive 
firms have become dependent  upon their stake- 
holders. Senior executives must, therefore, ensure 
the cooperation and commitment  of these stake- 
holders. It is no longer enough to say that it 
would be nice, somehow,  if senior executives 
recognized their social responsibilities to others. 
Now we can say it is essential that senior execu- 
tives perform their managerial responsibilities in 
a way that will benefit their firms by increasing 
the cooperation and commitment  of the stake- 
holders. 
In one last paragraph of introduction, let me 
suggest that the same progression over time from 
the operational level to the functional and techni- 
cal levels through to the conceptual level that can 
be seen in the activities at business firms, can 
also be seen in the courses at business schools. 
Schools of business administration have moved  
over  the past 25 years from teaching the basic 
principles useful in operational management ,  to 
the quantitative models applicable in the func- 
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tional departments, to the computer  systems 
needed for the technical areas, to the competitive 
concepts required for strategic planning. In the 
next five years I forecast that these schools will 
move even further, to the ethical principles re- 
quired for stakeholder commitment.  
In summary, the argument of this paper  is 
that the global conditions of management  have 
changed, that firms now operate as extended 
organizations dependent  upon  their stakeholder 
groups. In this environment,  senior executives 
have the ultimate micro "for what" responsibility 
to build commitment  among those groups and 
should be held accountable for that commitment.  
Let me now start my support  of this argument at 
the bot tom of the proposed  hierarchy of adminis- 
trative activities and responsibilities, and work  
u p .  
ACTIVITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
A t the bot tom of the administrative hierar- 
chy is the operational level, where prod- 
ucts are manufactured, customers are 
served, revenues are generated, and bills are 
paid. For many  smaller firms, particularly in the 
basic service industries, this is the primary level 
of activity and responsibility. In these small orga- 
nizations there is little need for quantitative 
analysis in the functional areas of marketing, 
production, or finance; close contacts with cus- 
tomers, workers, and creditors seem more effec- 
tive. There is little need for advanced systems in 
the technical areas of  human staffing, data pro- 
cessing, and product/process design; manual 
methods and desktop computers  seem quite suit- 
able. There is even limited concern for the com- 
petitive concepts of scale/scope economies,  entry 
barriers, and learning curves; a good shop or 
store location with plenty of parking seems more 
desirable. 
Good  operating level companies don't  p l a n - -  
they do. They seem to adapt  naturally to local 
conditions, and they usually remain successful as 
long as the local economies  upon  which they are 
dependent  prosper. Personal time, effort, and 
leadership are all required, of course, but the 
owners and managers (often combined in one 
person or one family or one group) appear  to 
look upon  their primary tasks as satisfying cus- 
tomers, improving methods, and conserving as- 
sets. These, I would like to think, are also the 
most basic performance outcomes we should be 
able to expect from corporate managers. They 
are often forgotten in the largest companies,  un- 
fortunately, but some of the most famous mana- 
gerial texts and articles (Ouchi 1981 or Peters and 
Waterman 1982) have done little more than re- 
mind corporate managers and others of these 
most basic operational responsibilities. 
The next level of activity in most corpora- 
tions is that of functional management ,  where 
planning begins to supplant doing. Marketing 
policies are established through analytical ap- 
proaches to pricing levels, distribution channels, 
and promotional means. Production policies are 
arranged by mathematical programs for machine 
scheduling, line balancing, and job sequencing. 
Financial policies are developed through eco- 
nomic comparisons of investment projects, lease/  
purchase arrangements, and debt/equity struc- 
tures. Here we have the province of the quantita- 
tive techniques taught so extensively in schools 
of business administration. The expected out- 
comes of the application of these techniques are 
the maximization of revenues, minimization of 
costs, and optimization of returns. These, I think 
we can easily claim, are the performance criteria 
and micro-level responsibilities of management  at 
the functional level. 
The third level of activity is that of technical 
management ,  where the human and machine 
capabilities for improved planning and perfor- 
mance are developed. Human resource depart- 
ments are set up to select, train, motivate, and 
involve employees.  Data processing departments 
are established to record, organize, transmit, and 
provide access to information. Engineering de- 
partments are charged to shorten the design 
cycles for both products and processes by involv- 
ing employees and making use of information 
from all of the functional departments. The ex- 
pected outcomes of corporate managers at this 
level include the involvement of people, the utili- 
zation of information, and the design of new 
products and processes. Again, we can set these 
up as the performance criteria and micro-level 
responsibilities of management  at the technical 
level. 
The fourth level of activity is that of concep- 
tual management.  This is the level that was origi- 
nally termed strategic planning or strategic man- 
agement. In the early 1970s strategic planning 
primarily focused on the direction of the firm. "If 
you don' t  know where  you're going, any road 
will take you there" was a popular  phrase re- 
peated at many  conferences and in many  class- 
rooms. This obviously true but not particularly 
insightful belief was expressed with much greater 
precision by Kenneth Andrews (1980), when  he 
defined strategy as "the pattern of the goals and 
objectives of the organization and the design of 
the major policies and procedures to achieve 
those goals and objectives stated in such a way 
as to define the nature of the business and the 
character of the company." Strategy, in Andrews' 
model, matched the opportunities and risks in 
the environment (what should we  do?) with the 
strengths and weaknesses of the firm (what can 
we do?) and with the values and attitudes of the 
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Operational Satisfying customers 
Management Improving products 
Conserving assets 
Functional Maximizing revenues 
Management Minimizing costs 
Optimizing returns 
Technical Involving people 
Management Utilizing information 
Applying technology 
Conceptual Setting objectives 







management (what do we want to do?). He con- 
cluded that the range of options open to the 
company often was an "embarrassment of riches" 
that could be achieved through geographic ex- 
pansion, product diversification, or vertical inte- 
gration. 
The embarrassment of riches faded quickly in 
the early 1980s with the advent of intense global 
competition. Strategic planning became not so 
much the direction of the firm to achieve corpo- 
rate objectives, as the positioning of the firm to 
gain competitive advantages. Michael Porter 
(1980) described the five forces that determined 
the profitability of an industry (supplier power, 
customer power, new entrants, substitute prod- 
ucts, and producer rivalry). It was now necessary 
to consider entry barriers, value chains, scale and 
scope economies, experience curves, competitor 
intentions, customer preferences, distributor re- 
strictions, and national policies in selecting the 
strategy of the firm. C. K. Prahalad (1990) added 
the need to build an architectural framework of 
competitive strategies based upon a foundation 
of core competencies. Combining Andrews, Por- 
ter, and Prahalad results in specifying the ex- 
pected outcomes of management at the concep- 
tual level as setting achievable objectives, gaining 
competitive advantages, and building core com- 
petencies. 
The 12 performance criteria from the four 
non-controversial levels of managerial activities 
are summarized in F igure  2. If those activities 
were performed well, and if the criteria were met 
fully, then most people would agree that the firm 
was operating with adequate economic efficiency 
(converting scarce resources into wanted goods 
and services at minimal costs) and with satisfac- 
tory competitive effectiveness (providing returns 
or achieving "rents" above the mean for all other 
firms within the industry). 
The question now is: Is this enough? Can we 
realistically expect to hold corporate managers 
accountable for anything more than satisfying 
customers, improving products, and conserving 
assets in such a way as to achieve adequate eco- 
nomic efficiency and satisfactory competitive 
effectiveness? 
The response of most normative ethicists and 
social philosophers is that it is not enough. 
They- -and  I - -would  say that business firms are 
not simple black boxes that transform scarce 
resources into needed goods and services with 
adequate economic efficiency, and that maintain 
an industry position with satisfactory competitive 
effectiveness. They and I would claim that busi- 
ness firms consist of people. These people exist 
both within the organization (operational em- 
ployees, functional managers, technical staff, 
senior executives, and company owners) and 
outside the organization (retail and industrial 
customers, material and component  suppliers, 
wholesale and retail distributors, bank and trade 
creditors, local residents, national citizens, and 
global inhabitants). These people can be harmed 
by company actions on such diverse issues as 
employee layoffs, salary differentials, plant clos- 
ings, workplace dangers, pension reversions, tax 
rebates, political contributions, advertising claims, 
package sizes, pharmaceutical prices, foreign 
payments, owl habitats, photo exhibits, job ex- 
ports, and management incentives. These people, 
we claim, are owed thoughtful consideration. 
These people, we insist, represent the macro 
level "to whom" responsibilities of management. 
"Why?" respond those who believe in legal 
systems and market paradigms. "Laws wil l --or  
should--prevent  anyone from lying, cheating, 
stealing or colluding, and markets wil l--or  again 
should--adjust supply costs, salary levels, pro- 
duction rates, and product prices so resources are 
used for their highest purpose. We grant that it is 
distressing for an employee to be laid off, but 
there is a labor market out there for his or her 
skills. We understand it is disturbing for a forest 
to be cut down, but there is a factor market out 
there for the trees and the price in that market 
indicates that society values lumber for building 
houses more than woodland for camping trips." 
Our answer, of course, is that often laws 
don't  reflect current social values, markets don't 
adjust to long-term consumer preferences, and 
prices don't include the external costs (environ- 
mental pollution and resource depletion) associ- 
ated with the products and processes. The an- 
swer of our critics to these charges is that they 
are not advocating obsolete laws, inefficient mar- 
kets, or incomplete prices, and that together we 
must change the laws, improve the markets, and 
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complete the prices. We in turn respond that 
those are impossible requirements. Ethicists and 
advocates of the legal system and the market  
paradigm have never been  able to achieve agree- 
ment on the macro-level responsibilities of corpo- 
rate managers to society. I doubt  they ever will 
do so because - -as  explained earher, in the intro- 
duction to this pape r - - those  macro "to whom" 
responsibilities contradict basic theoretical as- 
sumptions in both legal and economic thought. 
THE EXTENDED VIEW OF THE 
BUSINESS FIRM 
L et us return, instead, to the micro "for what" responsibilities of corporate manag- ers, where  we may be able to achieve 
agreement.  Let us also, for now, adopt  the "ex- 
tended" view of a business firm. In this view, a 
company consists of much more than just the 
property it owns, the material it uses, the people  
it employs, and the product it produces. In this 
view a company  also consists of  a set of  relation- 
ships with material and componen t  suppliers, 
credit and equity institutions, worker  and mana- 
gerial/techanical staff sources, wholesale and 
retail distributors, and industrial and individual 
customers. In this view a company  further con- 
sists of a set of dependencies  upon  national com- 
munication, transportation, education, and health 
care systems, and upon  global trade agreements,  
monetary exchanges, factor costs and environ- 
mental constraints. This extended view of a busi- 
ness firm is shown graphically in F igure  3. 
There is not space in this article to trace the 
theoretical development  and list the empirical 
support  for the extended view of business firms. 
Let me just state, for those who  are perhaps 
somewhat  hesitant to accept this view without 
further thought, that the largest supply expense 
for General Motors in 1990 was not for the pur- 
chase of steel or rubber  or engines or tires, but 
for the purchase of employee  health care. Let me 
also state that the largest current problem for 
many  microelectronic and bioengineering firms is 
not the intensity of global competition, but the 
shortage of technical staff. Companies compete  
based upon  their costs and skills. Corporate man- 
agers cannot ignore those costs and skills and 
still achieve adequate economic efficiency and 
satisfactory competitive effectiveness. 
If you are willing, for now, to accept the 
extended view of a business organization, then I 
would hope  that you would be willing to accept 
the collateral argument that it is the micro-level 
responsibility of senior executives to deal with 
the major costs and major problems revealed by 
that view. If health care is a major overhead cost, 
and if overhead cost is a major problem in global 
competition, then it is the responsibility of senior 
Figure 3 
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executives to attempt to control that cost. The 
cost of health care, however, cannot be con- 
trolled by changes in technology or advances m 
efficiency; at all events we can say with consider- 
able confidence that the cost of health care has 
not been  controlled in the past by technology or 
efficiency. 
The problem in the cost of health care is not 
technology nor efficiency. The problem is that 
the demand has far outstripped the supply, and 
we no longer have the uncommitted resources on 
the national level to increase the supply. So con- 
trolling health care costs at the corporate level 
means either reducing the benefits distributed to 
the employees  and retirees, or reducing the 
amounts paid to the providers. When you reduce 
benefits or payments  you are imposing harms 
upon  others in ways outside their own control. 
When you impose harms upon  others in ways 
that are outside of their own control, my argu- 
ment  is that you have moved  from the concep- 
tual to the ethical level in the hierarchy of mana- 
gerial activities and responsibilities. 
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THE ETHICAL LEVEL OF ACTIVITIES 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
W e  hat, then, are the activities and re- 
sponsibilities of management  at the 
thical level? The activities at this level 
are the distribution of the benefits generated by 
the firm and the allocation of the costs or harms 
imposed by the firm. Distributing benefits, of 
course, is easy and pleasant work. It is always 
easy to raise salaries, pay bonuses, announce 
expansions. It is always pleasant to offer con- 
tracts, build plants, raise dividends. 
Allocating harms, however, is not easy and 
pleasant work. It is not easy to cut salaries, elimi- 
nate bonuses, announce restructurings. It is not 
pleasant to cancel contracts, close plants, reduce 
dividends. Yet often this has to be done. We have 
entered a period of intense global competit ion 
when  costs have to be cut, plants have to be 
closed, and contracts have to be canceled. This 
has to be  done, and my argument is that it has to 
be done well. 
Distributing benefits and allocating harms 
"well" does not mean just performing these ac- 
tivities harshly or sternly or with a lack of care 
and compassion. Performing these activities 
"well" means that the distribution of benefits and 
allocation of harms is accomplished in such a 
way that the stakeholders within the firm (opera- 
tional employees,  functional managers, technical 
staff, and senior executives), within the industry 
(material and component  suppliers, credit and 
equity sources, workers and managerial/technical 
communities, and wholesale and retail distribu- 
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tors), and within the country (local residents, 
regional inhabitants, and national citizens) will 
consider that distribution and that allocation to 
have been "right" and "proper" and "just." 
Why is there any need to be "right" and 
"proper" and "just" in the distribution of benefits 
and the allocation of harms? If a company  is de- 
pendent  upon  its stakeholders in an extended 
organization, then the managers of that company 
need the cooperation and even the commitment  
of  those stakeholders to achieve economic effi- 
ciency and competitive effectiveness. I know of 
no direct empirical evidence to support  this view, 
but certainly we have all had adequate personal 
experiences to indicate that stakeholders who  
believe that they have been treated "wrongly" or 
"improperly" or "unjustly" tend to be neither 
cooperative nor committed. 
My argument is that the stakeholders in an 
extended organization who  believe they have 
been treated "rightly" and "properly" and "justly" 
tend to develop a sense of community that leads 
to a total organizational effort. That effort is 
needed to achieve the desired goals of economic 
efficiency and competitive effectiveness. That 
effort is the final responsibility of  management  at 
the micro level, as shown in F igure  4. 
How can senior executives convince the 
stakeholders of the firm that they have been 
treated "rightly" and "properly" and "justly"? Free- 
man (1984) has suggested a series of explicit 
negotiations with the various stakeholder groups, 
but that would require that each group have a 
formal structure and designated individuals to 
conduct the negotiations. Further, conducting the 
negotiations would be a cumbersome,  time-con- 
suming process. 
My suggestion would be that senior execu- 
tives make use of ethical principles rather than 
economic imperatives in deciding on the distribu- 
tion of benefits and the allocations of harms. Is 
this distribution or this allocation "right"? Is it 
"proper"? Is it "just"? I freely admit that I am what 
Thomas Dunfee (1991) terms an ecumenical ethi- 
cist and search for a preponderance or conver- 
gence among a set of ten Western ethical theories 
rather than rely upon  the outcome of a single 
ethical principle. I don't, however, think that the 
basis--single principle or multiple principles---of 
moral reasoning matters in this instance. What 
does matter is that the final decision on the distri- 
bution of benefits or the allocation of harms is 
"more right" and "more proper" and "more just" 
than if just economic factors were considered, 
and that it is seen as "more right" and "more 
proper" and "more just" by the stakeholders. 
W i n  hat are the responsibilities of the 
senior executives at the ethical level 
the managerial hierarchy of the firm? 
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They have the responsibility--and should be held 
accountable for the ou tcome-- to  improve the 
cooperation and to increase the commitment of 
all of the stakeholders of the firm. This requires 
the distribution of the benefits and the allocation 
of the harms generated by the firm in a way that 
is seen by the stakeholders of that firm as "right" 
and "proper" and "just." The micro "for what" 
and the macro "to whom" responsibilities of cor- 
porate managers converge at the ethical level of 
management. ~1 
References  
K.R. Andrews, The Concept of Corporate Strategy 
(Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1980). 
R.A. Anthony, J.S. Reece, and G. Welsch, Fu,zdamen- 
tals of Management Accounting (Homewood, Ill.: 
Richard D. Irwin, 1985) 
A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, TheModern Corporation 
and Private Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, 1936). 
N.E. Bowie, "Challenging the Egoistic Paradigm," Busi- 
ness Ethics Quarterly, 1 (1991): 1-22. 
R.T. DeGeorge, Business Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 
1982). 
T.W. Dunfee, "Business Ethics and Extant Social Con- 
tracts," Business Ethics Quarterly, 1 (1991): 23-51. 
R.E. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach (Marshfleld, Mass.. Pitman, 1984). 
L.T. Hosmer, "Managerial Ethics and Microeconomic 
Theory," Journal of Business Ethics, 4 (1984): 17-23. 
C.S. McCoy, Management of Values: The Ethical Differ- 
ence in Corporate Policy and PerformatTce (Marshfield, 
Mass.: Pitman, 1985). 
W.G. Ouchi, Theory Z (Reading, Mass.: Addison- 
Wesley, 1981). 
T.J. Peters and R.H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence 
(New York. Harper & Row, 1982). 
M.E. Porter, Compet, tive Strategy: Techniques for Ana- 
lyzing Industries and Competilors (New York: Free 
Press, 1980). 
C.K. Prahalad and G. Hamel, "The Core Competence 
of the Corporation," Harvard Business Rewew, May- 
June 1990, pp. 79-93. 
C.D. Stone, Where the Law Ends. The Social Control of 
Corporate Behavior (Boston: Harper & Row, 1975). 
M.G. Velasquez, Business Ethics: Concepts & Cases 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982). 
LaRue Tone Hosmer is a professor of cor- 
porate strategy and managerial ethics 
at the Graduate School of Business Ad- 
ministration, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor. 
Managerial Responslbilities on the Micro Level 55 
